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Abstract
We investigate a desirable role of public enterprise in mixed oligopoly in free-entry markets.
We compare the following three cases: (i) a public firm produces before private firms (public
leadership), (ii) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot), (iii) a public firm produces after
private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public leadership
is worst, in contrast to the cases without entries and exits of private firms. We also investigate
the welfare implication of privatization. We find that some important results shown by existing
works do not hold under private leadership.
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1 Introduction
We have observed a worldwide wave of privatization of public enterprises. Nevertheless, many
state-owned public firms still continue to exist and many of them compete against private firms
in developed, developing, and former communist transitional countries. Public and private firms
compete in a range of industries including the airline, rail, telecommunications, natural gas, elec-
tricity, steel, and overnight-delivery industries as well as in services including banking, home loans,
health care, life insurance, hospitals, broadcasting, and education. In addition, we observe many
cases of public involvement in private firms facing financial problems, and the firms that obtain
public funds compete against pure private firms.
Recently studies on mixed oligopoly involving both private and public enterprises, have become
increasingly popular.1 Many existing works assume that the public firm maximizes social welfare
(the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits) whereas the private firm maximizes its own prof-
its.2 Some works on mixed oligopoly analyzed Cournot-type simultaneous-move games. Others
analyzed Stackelberg-type sequential-move games. Whether the public firm assumes a leadership
role is important because an alternative order of moves often gives rise to different results. De Fraja
and Delbono (1989) show that in quantity-setting simultaneous-move games, welfare-maximizing
behavior by a public firm is not always more efficient than profit-maximizing behavior. Thus, the
1 This interest in mixed oligopolies is due to their importance to the economies of Europe, Canada, and Japan,
as well as China, Russia, Brazil and India. Although they are less significant in the United States, there are some
examples of mixed oligopolies such as the packaging and overnight-delivery industries. In addition, in the US the
government recently have provided public funds for firms in financial and automobile industries, as well as in many
European and Asian countries. Recently, the literature on mixed oligopoly has become richer and more diverse.
For example, Mujumdar and Pal (1998) consider tax effects. Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal
and White (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002), Dadpay and Heywood (2006), Matsushima and Matsumura (2006),
Chao and Yu. (2006) and Fujiwara (2006) investigate international competition. Gil-Molto´ and Poyago-Theotoky
(2008) examine adoption of FMS. Ishida and Matsushima (2008) investigate wage bargaining. Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n (2003) discuss a merger problem. Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2006) and Ohori (2006) analyze environmental
policies. Cremer et al. (1991), Matsushima and Matsumura (2003), Lu and Poddar (2007), and Heywood and Ye
(2008a,b) analyze endogenous product differentiation and spatial competition. Lee (2006) discusses mixed markets
under vertical relationship. Lee and Hwang (2003) and Heywood and Ye (2009) investigate agency problem.
2 The assumption of welfare-maximizing public firms is popular in the literature. See, among others, Anderson
et al. (1997), Cremer et al. (1991), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Merrill and Schneider (1966), and Pal (1998).
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privatization of a public firm may improve welfare even without improving the managerial effi-
ciency of the public firm. Furthermore, Matsumura (1998) shows that under moderate conditions,
welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is not optimal if we allow partial privatization,
and also explains that partial privatization usually improves welfare. By contrast, in sequential-
move games where a public firm is the leader, welfare-maximizing behavior is always better than
profit-maximizing behavior by the public firm. Thus, the effect of privatization of a public firm
depends on whether each firm moves simultaneously or sequentially.3
In all of the papers mentioned above, the number of private firms is given exogenously.4 This
assumption was very natural because many mixed markets were highly regulated, with both ex-
plicit and implicit restrictions on entry. These entry restrictions have, however, been significantly
weakened in recent years. We now observe new entry of private firms in many mixed markets
such as the banking, insurance, and transportation markets in Japan. Thus, we should regard the
models with fixed number of firms as short-run models.
In this paper, we conduct a long-run analysis by examining free-entry markets. We consider
a game where private firms choose whether to enter the market, and then face quantity-setting
competition. We investigate the following three cases: (i) a public firm produces before private
firms (public leadership), (ii) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot), (iii) a public firm pro-
duces after private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public
leadership is worst. This is in sharp contrast to the short-run case. In the short-run (when the
number of firms is given exogenously), public leadership is always better than the Cournot case
and private leadership is either better or worse than public leadership.5 Our result contrasts with
3 For the discussion on sequential move games and endogenous timing games in mixed oligopoly, see Beato and
Mas-Colell (1984), Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003a,b), Lu (2006), and Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007).
4 Using monopolistic competition models, Anderson et al. (1997) discuss free-entry markets. See also Matsumura
and Kanda (2005) and Branda˜o and Castro (2007) for homogeneous goods oligopoly and Fujiwara (2007) for another
formulation of product differentiation in free-entry mixed markets.
5 Pal (1998) shows that private leadership dominates public leadership under linear demand and constant marginal
costs. As Matsumura (2003a) shows, this result does not depend on the linear demand. However, it depends on the
assumption of constant marginal cost. It is possible that public leadership is better under increasing marginal costs.
See Tomaru and Kiyono (2006).
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the existing one with fixed number of firms in the following two respects.6 (1) public leadership
yields the smaller welfare than Cournot, which never appears in the case with a fixed number of
firms and (2) private leadership is always best.
Our result indicates that public firm should be the follower. In other words, the public firm
plays a complementary role of private firms as a potential competitor. If the public firm cannot
commit to being the follower, it should play the same role as the private firms under conditions of
equal footing and should commit to the Cournot role at an earlier stage. Commitment is important
because the firm has an incentive to be the leader after the entry of private firms.
We also investigate the welfare implication of privatization. We find that private leadership
yields a starkly different welfare implication from existing works on simultaneous move games. If
firms face simultaneous move competition, the public firm running a deficit should be shut down
in the long run.7 This holds true when the public firm is the leader but not when it is the follower.
In the latter case, the public firm can be desirable for the society even if it operates with a deficit
in the long run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3 investigates the
equilibrium outcomes when the number of private firms is given. Section 4 investigates how the
free entry of private firms affects the equilibrium welfare and presents the main results. Section 5
examines the effect of privatization. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Basic Setting
Firms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the market inverse demand function
is given by p(q) : R+ → R+ (price as a function of quantity).
Firm 0 is a public firm and it is assumed to maximize social welfare.8 Firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is
6 Similar contrasts are intensively discussed in the context of international trade. Lahiri and Ono (1995) show
that some well-known theorems under perfect competition hold true in a Cournot-type oligopoly under free entry,
but not when the number of firms is given exogenously. For the discussions on competition policy and industrial
policy, see Etro (2004,2006,2007,2008), Davidson and Mukherjee (2007), and Marjit and Mukherjee (2008).
7 See Anderson et al. (1997) and Matsumura and Kanda (2005).
8 The assumption that the public firms maximize welfare implies that the owner (government) of the public firms
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a private firm maximizing its own profits. Social welfare W is the sum of consumer surplus and
firms’ profits, and is given by
W =
∫ X
0
p(q)dq − pX +
n∑
i=0
Πi =
∫ X
0
p(q)dq −
n∑
i=0
(ci(xi) + fi),
where Πi ≡ pxi − ci − fi is firm i’s profit, xi is firm i’s output, ci(xi) : R+ → R+ is firm i’s
production cost, fi (> 0) is firm i’s entry cost (i = 0, 1, ..., n), and X is the total output given by
X ≡
n∑
i=0
xi.
We make the following assumptions on the cost and demand functions.
Assumption 1. p(X) is twice differentiable and p′ < 0 ∀X such that p(X) > 0.
Assumption 2. c′′i > 0 ∀xi > 0 and ci (i = 0, 1..., n) is strictly increasing ∀xi ≥ 0.9
We employ three models: the first depicts the case where the public firm is the leader (we
call it L-model), the second one is the model wherein all firms face Cournot competition (C-
model), and the last is the case where the public firm is the follower (we call it F-model). All
are complete information games. In the first stage, private firms independently choose whether
is a welfare-maximizer and there is no agency problem in the public firms. This assumption is adopted intentionally
to stress our purpose, which is to show that even under ideal situations for public firms above, public firm’s leadership
impairs welfare at free entry markets under plausible conditions. In this paper we do not allow the government to
nationalize more than one firm. As pointed out by Merrill and Schneider (1966), the most efficient outcome is
achieved by the nationalization of all firms in the case where nationalization does not change firms’ costs (i.e., there
is no X-inefficiency in the public firm). The need for an analysis of mixed oligopoly lies in the fact that it is impossible
or undesirable, for political or economic reasons, to nationalize an entire sector. For example, without competitors
public firms may lose the incentive to improve their costs, resulting in a loss of social welfare. Thus we neglect the
possibility of nationalizing all firms. Our result holds true for cases of more than one public firm unless the number
of private firms is zero.
9 We do not allow c′′i to be non-positive. If c
′′ ≤ 0, then average cost (ci + fi)/xi is decreasing (because fi > 0)
for any output level. If a public firm is as efficient as private firms, it is obvious that a monopoly by the public
firm is desirable. In order to eliminate such an obvious case we assume c′′i > 0, which induces the U-shaped average
cost curve. Some readers may think that public firms are usually less efficient than private firms. However, not all
studies show that public enterprises perform more poorly than private (See Stiglitz (1988) ch. 7). Thus, we think
that it is important to investigate the case where a public firm is as efficient as each private firm, although we allow
differences between the cost functions of public and private firms. For discussion of endogenous cost differences, see
Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and Nett (1994).
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to enter the market. In the second stage, the public firm (firm 0) competes against private firms
entering the market. In the L-model, firm 0 chooses x0 first. After observing x0, each private firm
i simultaneously chooses xi. In the C-model, all firms, including both private and public firms,
choose their outputs independently. In the F-model, all private firms entering the market choose
their outputs independently. After observing the total output of private firms, firm 0 chooses x0.
3 Short-run analysis given the number of firms
We investigate the equilibrium outcome in the three models. We use the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium as the equilibrium concept and solve the game by backward induction. Thus, we
discuss the second-stage game, given the number of private firms n.
3.1 The C-model
First, we discuss the C-model where all firms independently choose their outputs. The first-order
condition of each private firm i (i = 1, 2, ...n) is given by10
p′(X)xi + p(X)− c′i(xi) = 0. (1)
The first-order condition of firm 0 is given by
p(X)− c′0(x0) = 0. (2)
We make an assumption that guarantees the second-order conditions and the stability condition
of the Cournot model.
Assumption 3 (Stability condition). p′′xi + p′ < 0 for i ∈ {1, 2..., n}.11
Let Ri(X−i) (i = 0, 1, . . . , n) denote the firm i’s reaction function in the second-stage game, where
X−i ≡
∑
i∈{0,1,...,i−1,i+1,...,n} xi.
10 We focus on the cases where each model has a unique and interior solution throughout the paper.
11 p′′ ≤ 0 is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for Assumption 3. Note that this assumption allow linear
demand functions, which are commonly used in the literature.
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From hereon, we assume that all private firms are identical, although we allow that the cost of
the public firm (firm 0) is different from that of each private firm.
Assumption 4 (Identical private firms). ci(x) = c1(x) and fi = f1 ∀x ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, 2..., n}.
Henceforth, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria where each private firm entering
the market chooses the same output. In other words, we assume that x1 = x2 =, ...,= xn in
equilibria. We can show that the unique equilibrium is symmetric in all second-stage (production
stage) subgames.
3.2 The L-Model
We discuss the L-model where all private firms independently choose their outputs after observing
x0 . The first-order condition of private firm 1 is given by (1). The first-order condition of firm 0
is given by
p(X)− c′0(x0) + nR′1(X−1)(p(X)− c′1(x1)) = 0. (3)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied.
R1 is derived from (1) and thus satisfies
R′1(X−1) =
∂R1(X−1)
∂x0
= − p
′ + p′′x1
n(p′ + p′′x1) + (p′ − c′′1)
∈ (−1/n, 0).
Therefore, the impact of x0 on the total output of the private firms nR′1(X−1) lies in (−1, 0).
This is a well-known result in the standard quantity-setting games. An increase in the output of
the leader decreases the total output of the followers and increases the total output of all firms
(including the leader and the followers).
3.3 The F-Model
We discuss the F-model where firm 0 chooses x0 after observing all private firms’ outputs. Given
n, the first-order condition of the public firm is the same as that in the C-model. The first-order
condition of firm 1 is
(1 +R′0(X−0))p
′(X)x1 + p(X)− c′1(x1) = 0. (4)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied.
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R0 is derived from (2) and thus satisfies
R′0(X−0) =
∂R0(X−0)
∂x1
= − p
′
p′ − c′′0
∈ (−1, 0).
Therefore, even if a follower is the public firm, an increase in the output of a leader decreases the
output of the follower and increases the total output of all firms.
3.4 Comparison among three models
Let xLi (n), x
C
i (n), and x
F
i (n) respectively denote firm i’s equilibrium output in the L-model, C-
model, and F-model, given the number of private firms n.
Lemma 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. Then, (i) xL0 (n) < x
C
0 (n) and x
L
1 (n) >
xC1 (n); (ii) x
F
0 (n) < x
C
0 (n) and x
F
1 (n) > x
C
1 (n).
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 (ii) states that the leadership of profit-maximizing firms (private firms) evokes aggres-
sive behavior as in the standard quantity-setting games. On the other hand, Lemma 1 (i) states
that the welfare-maximizing firm (public firm) gets accommodative if it assumes leadership. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. In the C-model, firm 0 chooses x0 so as to maximize the
total social surplus given the outputs of private firms. In the L-model, a decrease in x0 increases
x1. In other words, production substitution takes place from firm 0 to all private firms. Since
p = c′0 > c′1 in the C-model, the above production substitution saves the production cost, resulting
in an improvement in welfare.12 Thus, firm 0 chooses a smaller output in the L-model than in the
C-model.
Let W j(n) (CSj(n)) denote the equilibrium welfare (equilibrium consumer surplus) in the j-
model (j = {L,C, F}), given the number of firms n.
Proposition 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. Then, (i) WL(n) > WC(n) and
CSL(n) < CSC(n); (ii) WF (n) > WC(n) and CSF (n) > CSC(n).
12 For clear discussion on this welfare-enhancing production substitution effects, see Lahiri and Ono (1988,1997).
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Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1(i) states that the leadership of the public firm improves welfare in the short run.
In the L-model, the public firm can choose the same output level as in the C-model. Thus, by
definition, welfare is never smaller in the L-model than in the C-model. The strict inequality is
derived from Lemma 1(i).
Proposition 1(ii) states that the leadership of the private firm also improves welfare. In the
F-model, all the firms’ behaviors become closer to marginal cost pricing than in the C-model since
each private firm chooses a higher output level in the L-model than in the C-model and the public
firm engages in marginal cost pricing in both models. This results in welfare improvement.
As for consumer surplus, Proposition 1(i) (Proposition 1(ii)) states that leadership of the public
firm reduces (whereas that of the private firms enhances) consumer surplus. As discussed above,
firm 0 (firm 1) chooses a smaller (greater) output when it is the leader, resulting in a smaller
(greater) total output and higher (lower) price. Note that in the L-model, firm 0 must abandon
marginal cost pricing to urge the private firms toward marginal cost pricing. This factor negatively
affects consumer surplus.
4 Long-run analysis with free entry
We investigate the first stage. We neglect the integer problem of the number of private firms. At
free-entry equilibrium, each private firm’s profit must be zero.13 Thus, we have
p(X)x1 − c1(x1)− f1 = 0. (5)
Let xj0, x
j
1, n
j , and Xj respectively denote the equilibrium output of firm 0, the equilibrium
output of each private firm, the equilibrium number of private firms, and the equilibrium total
output in the j-model (j = {L,C, F}).
13 If each private firm needs capital, c1 includes capital costs. The zero-profit condition means that excess profit
of each firm is zero.
9
Lemma 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. Then, (i) xC1 = x
L
1 < x
F
1 , (ii) X
C =
XL < XF , (iii) xL0 < x
C
0 , (iv) x
F
0 < x
C
0 , and (v) n
L > nC .
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2(i) contains a key result. First, we explain the intuition behind the result xC1 = x
L
1 .
In both the L-model and the C-model, the average cost curve of each private firm must be tangent
to the “residual demand curve” of each private firm at the long-run equilibrium. As is discussed
above, firm 0 is less aggressive in the L-model than in the C-model and chooses a smaller output
given n. This shifts firm 1’s residual demand curve upward, but in the long run it induces new
entries of private firms, yielding a downward shift in firm 1’s residual demand curve. Eventually,
the upward shift in firm 1’s residual demand curve caused by a smaller output of firm 0 is canceled
out by new entries, resulting in an unchanged curve. This is why two models yield the same
equilibrium output of each private firm at the long-run equilibrium (See Figure 1).
*********************************************
Insert Figure 1 here
*********************************************
Next, we explain the intuition behind the result xC1 < x
F
1 . As we explained above, the average
cost curve of each private firm must be tangent to the residual demand curve of each private firm.
In the F-model, the residual demand curve of each private firm is different from those in the L-
and the C-models. An increase in the private firm’s output decreases the public firm’s output.
Thus, given the output of other private firms, the slope of the residual demand curve becomes less
steep than those in the other two models. This yields a higher output of each private firm at the
long-run equilibrium (See Figure 2).
*********************************************
Insert Figure 2 here
*********************************************
We present our main result. Let W j (CSj) denote welfare (consumer surplus) at the long-run
equilibrium in the j-model (j = {L,C, F}).
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Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. Then, (i) WL < WC < WF and (ii)
CSL = CSC < CSF .
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
As for the comparison between the C- and the L-models in the long-run case, the public firm’s
leadership does not change consumer surplus. Nevertheless, the public firm’s leadership is not
beneficial in the long run. As discussed above, the public firm is more aggressive in the product
market in the C-model than in the L-model. This leads to a decrease in the number of private
firms n (Lemma 2(v)) without affecting the equilibrium price (Lemma 2(ii)). A larger output of
the public firm induces production substitution from the new entrants to the public firm. Let ac1
denote the private firm’s average cost. Since p = ac1 > c′0 in the L-model, the above production
substitution improves welfare. This is why the public firm’s leadership is harmful.
Proposition 2 states that the public firm should not assume leadership in the output market.
This is in sharp contrast to the implication suggested by Proposition 1, which states that the
public firm’s leadership improves welfare after the entry of private firms. These results indicate
that the problem of time inconsistency takes place: before the entries of private firms, the public
firm should not assume leadership, but after their entries, it has an incentive to be the leader.
Proposition 2 crucially depends on the assumption that the public firm becomes the leader
after the private firms’ entries. Alternatively, if we assume that the public firm can commit to
its output level before the private firms’ entries, this result does not hold. In such a case, the
logic of a leader being able to replicate the Cournot outcome works as in Proposition 1, and thus,
the public firm’s leadership must improve welfare. However, entry decision usually requires longer
time than choosing an output level. Thus, the timeline in our paper is at least as plausible as the
abovementioned alternative one.
Proposition 2 also states that the public firm should be the follower both from the viewpoint
of consumer surplus and total social surplus.14 In other words, private firms should act first and
14 A similar result is presented in Pal (1998) in a model with a fixed number of firms (a short-run model). He
shows that public followership yields higher welfare under the assumption of constant marginal costs. However, this
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the public firm should play a complementary role as the follower if possible. As discussed above,
each private firms’ output is greater in the F-model than in the C-model. Thus, the behavior of
all the firms (including the public firm engaging in marginal cost pricing in both models) becomes
closer to marginal cost pricing. This results in welfare and consumer-surplus improvement in the
long-run model as well as in the short-run model.
5 Privatization
In this section, we investigate the long-run effect of privatization. We assume that if the public
firm is privatized, no asymmetry exists between private and privatized firms in the long run. That
is, if the public firm is privatized, all the firms, including the privatized firm, have the same cost
function, c1 + f1, and they move simultaneously. Therefore, in the model where the public firm
is privatized, the ordinary symmetric Cournot competition with free entry emerges: each firm’s
first-order condition is (1) and the number of firms is determined by (5). In this setting, we have
the following proposition regarding privatization.
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. (i) In the L- and the C-models, pri-
vatization does not affect consumer surplus; (ii) in the L- and the C-models, privatization improves
welfare if and only if firm 0’s profit is negative; (iii) in the F-model, privatization always reduces
consumer surplus; and (iv) in the F-model firm 0’s deficit is a necessary (not sufficient) condition
that privatization improves welfare.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 2(i) and (ii), the C-model and the model where the public firm is
privatized must have the same total output; thus, Proposition 3(i) holds. (Note that in both the
models, (5) and (1) are satisfied.)
Profits of private firms are zero in all models. Consumer surplus in the L- and the C-models
is the same as that after privatization. Thus, privatization improves welfare if and only if firm 0’s
profit is negative before the privatization. This implies Proposition 3(ii).
result does not hold true under increasing marginal costs. The authors can provide a counterexample upon request.
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Propositions 2(i) and 3(i) imply that privatization raises the price in the F-model. Thus,
Proposition 3(iii) holds.
Consumer surplus in the F-model is larger than that after the privatization. Thus, in the
F-model, it is possible that privatization does not improve welfare even if firm 0’s profit is negative
before privatization, whereas privatization never improves welfare if firm 0’s profit is nonnegative.
This implies Proposition 3(iv). Q.E.D.
A result similar to that in Proposition 3(ii) is obtained in Anderson et al.(1997) in a monopo-
listic competition model. Proposition 3(iv) indicates that their principle cannot apply to the case
where the public firm is a follower. The public firm can be beneficial for the society even if it
operates with a deficit in the long run. We now emphasize that in our C-, L-, and F-models, the
public firm earns strictly positive profits as long as it has the same cost function as the private
firms do15, which is not true in Anderson et al. (1997).
6 Concluding Remarks
We investigated the desirable role of a public firm in mixed oligopoly in the long run. We obtained
a clearcut result. The public firm should be the follower since it yields the highest social welfare
and consumer surplus. The public firm should not be the leader since it yields the worst social
welfare and consumer surplus.
Note that in our timing structure, private firms’ entry decisions are made before the public
firm’s production decision. Thus, the public leader chooses its output given the number of entering
firms. In this timing structure, even if the public firm intends to be a leader, it is not necessary
for the public firm to be concerned with the long-run issue of private firms’ entries. The public
firm can easily be (or sometimes, possibly without intention) the leader by making its production
decisions more inflexible than private firms’ production decisions (not entry decisions) through,
for example, budgetary control of public finance16 or rigid administrative procedures. Our result
15 This is because xj0 > x
j
1 for j = {L,C, F} since the public firm engages in marginal cost pricing while each
private firm reduces its output under the marginal cost-pricing level.
16 For example, the Japanese government can choose to limit the supply of housing loans of the Public House
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indicates that such leadership is harmful in free-entry markets. Thus, once the market has been
transited from a regulated to free-entry one, the government should reform the public firm to make
it a more flexible one and, additionally, enhance the flexibility so as to accommodate the public
firm at least with competition on equal-footing (Cournot) and preferably with a complementary
role as the follower (private leadership).
Loan Corporation through budget control. If the government sets a binding limit, the public firm commits to its
output.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove this by contradiction. Let Xj(n) denote the short-run equilibrium
total output in the j-model (j = {L,C, F}).
(i) Suppose that xL0 (n) ≥ xC0 (n). Since n∂R1/∂x0 > −1, the total output in the L-model
(XL(n) = xL0 (n) + nR1) is never smaller than that in the C-model (X
C(n) = xC0 (n) + nR1).
Compare the first-order conditions in the two models. The first term in the LHS of (3) is never
larger than that in the LHS of (2) since the total output in the L-model is never smaller than that
in the C-model and p′ < 0. The second term in the LHS of (3), −c′0, is never larger than that in
the LHS of (2) since c′′0 > 0. The third term in the LHS of (3) is negative. Thus, if (2) is satisfied,
the LHS of (3) must be negative, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we obtain xL0 (n) < x
C
0 (n)
and this immediately implies that xL1 (n) > x
C
1 (n) by R
′
1 < 0.
(ii) Suppose that xF0 (n) ≥ xC0 (n). Then, from the first-order condition (2) and c′′0 > 0,
p(XF (n)) = c′0(xF0 (n)) ≥ c′0(xC0 (n)) = p(XC(n)). Thus, we must have XF (n) ≤ XC(n) by
p′ < 0. This implies that xF1 (n) ≤ xC1 (n) since we have supposed that xF0 (n) ≥ xC0 (n). Then, a
contradiction is induced as follows:
0 = p′(XC(n))xC1 (n) + p(X
C(n))− c′1(xC1 (n)) (∵ (1))
≤ p′(XC(n))xF1 (n) + p(XC(n))− c′1(xF1 (n)) (∵ xF1 (n) ≤ xC1 (n), p′ < 0, c′′1 > 0)
≤ p′(XF (n))xF1 (n) + p(XF (n))− c′1(xF1 (n)) (∵ XF (n) ≤ XC(n), Assumption 3)
< (1 +R′0)p
′(XF (n))xF1 (n) + p(X
F (n))− c′1(xF1 (n)) (∵ −1 < R′0 < 0, p′ < 0).
Thus, if (1) is satisfied, the LHS of (4) must be positive, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we
obtain xF0 (n) < x
C
0 (n) and this immediately implies that x
F
1 (n) > x
C
1 (n) by R
′
0 < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1(i): Firm 0 can choose x0 = xC0 (n) in the L-model. Thus, by definition,
WL(n) ≥ WC(n), and the equality is satisfied only when xL0 (n) = xC0 (n). From Lemma 1(i), we
obtain WL(n) > WC(n).
Since n∂R1/∂x0 > −1, XL(n) < XC(n) if and only if xL0 (n) < xC0 (n). Thus, CSL(n) < CSC(n)
is derived from Lemma 1(i). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1(ii): Since xF0 (n) < x
C
0 (n) by Lemma 1(ii), p(X
F (n)) = c′0(xF0 (n)) <
c′0(xC0 (n)) = p(XC(n)) from (2) and c′′0 > 0. Thus, we must have XF (n) > XC(n) by p′ < 0,
implying that CSF (n) > CSC(n).
We can show that WF (n) > WC(n) through the following manipulation:
WF (n)−WC(n) =
∫ XF (n)
XC(n)
p(q)dq − (c0(xF0 (n))− c0(xC0 (n)))− n (c1(xF1 (n))− c1(xC1 (n)))
>
∫ XF (n)
XC(n)
p(q)dq − n(c1(xF1 (n))− c1(xC1 (n))) (∵ xF0 (n) < xC0 (n), c′0 > 0)
> (XF (n)−XC(n))p(XF (n))− n
∫ xF1 (n)
xC1 (n)
c′1(q)dq (∵ XF (n) > XC(n), p′ < 0)
> n
∫ xF1 (n)
xC1 (n)
(
p(XF (n))− c′1(q)
)
dq (∵ XF (n)−XC(n) > n (xF1 (n)− xC1 (n)))
> 0 (∵ xF1 (n) > xC1 (n)),
where the last inequality comes from the fact that p(XF (n)) > c′1(q) for all q ∈ [xC1 (n), xF1 (n)]
since p(XF (n)) > c′1(xF1 (n)) by (4), xF1 (n) > xC1 (n), and c′′1 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2(i): First, we prove that xL1 = x
C
1 . Note that we prove this by considering
the fact that in both the C- and L-models, (5) and (1) are satisfied.
Let x∗ denote the output-minimizing average cost of the private firm (c1 + f1)/x1. We show
that xL1 ≤ x∗. Suppose, to the contrary, that xL1 > x∗, further, suppose that one private firm
(firm 2) deviates from the equilibrium strategy and chooses x2 = x∗. Since the firm 0’s output is
constant in the second stage, the deviation reduces the total output, resulting in the rise in price
(Note that in the L-model, firm 0 is the leader and chooses its output before observing the private
firms’ outputs). Firm 2’s profit is zero before the deviation by (5). The deviation raises the price
and reduces firm 2’s average cost, and thus, firm 2 obtains positive profits after the deviation,
which is a contradiction. For the same reason, we have xC1 ≤ x∗.
We prove that xL1 = x
C
1 by contradiction. Suppose that x
L
1 < x
C
1 . The equilibrium price in
each model is equal to the private firm’s average cost. Since xL1 < x
C
1 ≤ x∗, the equilibrium price
in the L-model is higher than that in the C-model. Since p′ < 0, it implies that XL < XC . We
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compare the LHS of (1) in the L-model with that in the C-model.
p′(XC)xC1 + p(X
C)− c′1(xC1 ) < p′(XL)xC1 + p(XL)− c′1(xC1 ) (∵ XL < XC and Assumption 3)
< p′(XL)xL1 + p(X
L)− c′1(xC1 ) (∵ xL1 < xC1 and p′ < 0)
< p′(XL)xL1 + p(X
L)− c′1(xL1 ) (∵ xL1 < xC1 and c′′1 > 0).
Thus, if (1) is satisfied in the C-model, the LHS of (1) in the L-model must be positive–a contra-
diction. Similarly, we suppose xL1 > x
C
1 and derive a contradiction.
Next, we prove that xF1 > x
C
1 . We can show that x
F
1 ≤ x∗ in almost a similar manner as in
the second paragraph of this proof except in using (2). Suppose, to the contrary, that xF1 > x
∗
and one private firm (firm 2) chooses x2 = x∗ (deviation from the equilibrium strategy). Since
−1 < R′0 < 0 from (2), the deviation increases the output of firm 0 but reduces the total output,
resulting in the rise in price. Therefore, for a similar reason as in the second paragraph, firm 2
obtains positive profits after the deviation, which is again a contradiction.
We prove that xF1 > x
C
1 by contradiction. Suppose that x
F
1 ≤ xC1 . The equilibrium price in
each model is equal to the private firm’s average cost. Since xF1 ≤ xC1 ≤ x∗, the equilibrium price
in the F-model is never lower than that in the C-model. Since p′ < 0, it implies that XF ≤ XC .
We compare the LHS of (4) with that of (1).
p′(XC)xC1 + p(X
C)− c′1(xC1 ) ≤ p′(XF )xC1 + p(XF )− c′1(xC1 ) (∵ XF ≤ XC and Assumption 3)
≤ p′(XF )xF1 + p(XF )− c′1(xC1 ) (∵ xF1 ≤ xC1 and p′ < 0)
≤ p′(XF )xF1 + p(XF )− c′1(xF1 ) (∵ xF1 ≤ xC1 and c′′1 > 0)
< (1 +R′0)p
′(XF )xF1 + p(X
F )− c′1(xF1 ) (∵ −1 < R′0 < 0).
Thus, if (1) is satisfied, the LHS of (4) must be positive–a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2(ii): The equilibrium price in the j-model (j = {L,C, F}) is equal to ac1(xj1)
(the average cost of firm 1). Since xC1 = x
L
1 < x
F
1 ≤ x∗ from the proof of Lemma 2(i), we have
ac1(xF1 ) < ac1(x
L
1 ) = ac1(x
C
1 ). Therefore, X
C = XL < XF is derived from p′ < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2(iii). From (3), we have p > c′0 in the L-model. From (2), we have p = c′0
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in the C-model. From Lemma 2(ii), we have that the equilibrium price in the L-model is equal to
that in the C-model. Since c′′0 > 0, xL0 must be smaller than xC0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2(iv): From (2), we have p = c′0 in both the F- and the C-models. From
Lemma 2(ii), we have that the equilibrium price in the F-model is lower than that in the C-model.
Since c′′0 > 0, xF0 must be smaller than xC0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2(v). This is derived from Lemma 2(i)–(iii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we compare the L-model and the C-model. Profits of all private
firms are zero in the two models. In the Proof of Lemma 2(ii), we have already shown that
p(XL) = p(XC). This implies that CSL = CSC . Since p− c′0 > 0 in the L-model and p− c′0 = 0 in
the C-model, firm 0 earns higher profit in the C-model than in the L-model given the same price
p(XL) = p(XC). These imply that WC > WL.
Next, we compare the F-model and the C-model. Profits of all private firms are zero in the two
models. In the Proof of Lemma 2(ii), we have already shown that p(XF ) < p(XC). This implies
that CSC < CSF . In both the F- and C-models, p = c′0. Thus, firm 0’s profit is maximized given
p. Since p(XF ) < p(XC), firm 0 earns higher profit in the C-model than in the L-model. The
consumer surplus in the F-model is larger than in the C-model by at least (p(XC) − p(XF ))XC
with XC < XF , and firm 0’s profit in the C-model is larger than in the F-model by at most
(p(XC)− p(XF ))xC0 with xF0 < xC0 . Since XC > xC0 , the welfare is larger in the F-model than in
the C-model. Q.E.D.
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MR1: marginal revenue of a private firm
AC1: average cost of a private firm
MC1: marginal cost of a private firm
Figure 1
D1: residual demand of a private firm
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Figure 2
DC1 : residual demand of a private firm in the C-Model
DF1
xF1
DF1 : residual demand of a private firm in the F-Model
23
